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Abstract 
Knowledge of patients’ location information (postal/zip codes) is critical in public health research. However, the inclusion of 
location information makes it easier to determine the identity of the individuals in the data sets. An efficient way to anonymize 
location information is through aggregation. In order to aggregate the locations efficiently, the data holder needs to know the 
locations’ adjacency information. A location adjacency matrix is big, and requires constant updates, thus it cannot be stored at the 
data holder’s end. A possible solution would be to have the adjacency matrix stored on a cloud server, the data holder can then 
query the required adjacency records. However, queries reveal information on patients’ locations, thus, we need to privately 
query the cloud server’s database. Existing private information retrieval protocols are inefficient for our context, therefore, in this 
paper, we present an efficient protocol to privately query the server’s database for adjacency information and thus preserving 
patients’ privacy. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Knowledge of patients’ location information is critical for exercising spatial epidemiology. A common patient 
residence location indicator is the postal/ZIP code. However, the inclusion of such location information makes it 
easier to determine the identity of the individuals in the data sets. Specifically, patients living in small geographic 
areas tend to be more easily re-identifiable because they are more likely to be unique on their demographics1,2. 
A common way to de-identify location information in health data is to stipulate a minimum population size for 
geographic areas, known as population size cut-off. The larger the population in the area, the less likely that an 
individual living there would be unique, and hence, the less likely that individual would be identifiable3,4. For 
example, the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule defines a small 
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geographic area as one having a population smaller than 20,000. Similarly, statistics Canada defines a small 
geographic area as one having a population smaller than 7,000. However, these rules do not take into consideration 
the nature or the number of variables in the health data under consideration (such as gender, age and education). In 
2010, El Emam et al developed statistical models for all regions of Canada using census data to determine when an 
area becomes sufficiently large that the risk of re-identification is negligible (i.e., empirically estimate population 
size cut-offs)5. This approach takes into consideration all information (variables) available about the individuals 
concerned when calculating the size cut-offs5. 
Population size cut-off rules can be implemented using aggregation and suppression6–8. Aggregation combines 
adjacent postal codes in order to form a larger population area while minimizing an objective function (or 
constraint). The function is usually problem dependant and is implemented to minimize certain features of the 
population. The minimal population size for every region (cut-off) is one such constraint. Other desirable constraints 
include compactness and contiguity. All records in areas that are still too small after aggregation are suppressed. The 
problem is known as constraint-based clustering. Several constraint-based clustering algorithms exist in the 
literature7–12  
In order to aggregate the zip/postal codes efficiently, the data holder needs to know the codes’ adjacency 
information. However, the zip/postal codes adjacency matrix is big and requires constant updates, thus it cannot be 
stored at the data holder’s end. A possible solution would be to have the adjacency matrix stored on a remote cloud 
server. The cloud would be responsible for maintaining/updating the database. The data holder can then query the 
needed adjacency records. However, queries reveal information on patients’ locations, hence the need to privately 
retrieve the required records. Existing private information retrieval protocols are inefficient and thus unusable in 
large problems, thus the motivation to come up with an efficient and private protocol for privately querying a public 
database.  
In this paper, we assume that the data to be aggregated consists of postal codes belonging to one Canadian region 
ܩ with ݊ postal codes. The cut-off size ܥ for ܩ is assumed to be known (note that if the data belongs to more than 
one region then the larger cut-off could be used). Moreover, we assume that the client has a storage capacity of 
ܱሺ݊ሻ, this assumption is common in the domain of data outsourcing as discussed in the next section. 
2. Background 
Retrieving public information from a remote server while protecting access privacy is a well-studied problem. 
Several cryptographic protocols have been designed for this purpose. These can be divided into two categories: 
Private information retrieval protocols (PIR)13,14, and hybrid approaches that employ PIR protocols on a selected 
subset of the database15. The main parameters of interest in these protocols are: the communication complexity 
between the database holder and the user, as well as the computation complexity for the database holder. 
2.1. PIR 
PIR provides protocols for querying a database while completely hiding the identity of the retrieved records from 
the database owners. PIR protocols model the problem as a database of ܰ bits ݔଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௡ (in our case, ݊ ൌ ܰ
ଶሻ, 
where the user wants to retrieve the bit with index݅, in other words, the index of the desired bit ݅ is assumed to be 
known to the user. PIR protocols can be divided into computational PIR and information theoretic PIR. 
Information theoretic PIR guarantee that the database holder obtains no information about the users’ queries. The 
database is replicated in ߙ non-communicating servers. The user queries each server and computes ݔ௜ from the 
outputs of all servers. The most efficient two server PIR has a communication complexity of ܱሺܰଵȀଷ) and a 
computational complexity of ܱሺܰሻ per bit ݔ௜16.  
Computational PIR (cPIR) schemes provide a weaker privacy guarantee; they ensure that a server can get 
information about the user query if it can solve a computationally difficult problem. cPIR schemes are attractive 
because database replication is not required (only one server is needed), and thus they do not risk privacy through 
the assumption of non-colluding servers. The most efficient cPIR protocol is due to Yi et al17. The algorithm uses 
fully homomorphic encryption18 to generate a communication complexity of ܱሺߛ݈݋݃ݐ ൅ ߛܰȀݐ) per block of data 
retrieved, where ݐ is the total number of blocks in the database, and ߛ is the ciphertext size. The computation 
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complexity of the algorithm is ܱሺܰȀʹሻ per block of data retrieved.  
As noted, PIR solutions have high computation complexity, and thus are not applicable to real problems15,19,20. 
2.1. Practical Hybrid Approaches 
In an attempt to reduce the cost of PIR, Wang et al15 proposed a new approach called bounding box PIR (bbPIR). 
The new approach unifies ݇-anonymity and cPIR. Given a client query requesting entry ix  in the database, the 
client anonymizes its query by requesting a submatrix (referred to as bounding box) of the public data matrix whose 
size is determined by the client’s privacy requirements. The computation cost in bbPIR depends on the area of the 
box, which in turn depends on the privacy requirements set by the client. 
While this method offers privacy for one query, it cannot solve our problem as it fails to guarantee privacy when 
several consecutive queries are requested by the client. In fact, queries requesting data from neighbouring cells 
generate bounding boxes with some intersection, the elements in the intersection might have a probability of being 
requested higher then the limit set by the user’s privacy requirements. 
Our protocol is presented in details in the next section, followed by privacy and complexity analysis.  
3. Solution 
The client has a database ܦ of patients’ records. The client wants to de-identify ܦ in order to share it with some 
researcher. ܦ has a set ܵ of unique postal codes (ܵ is a subset of ܩ). ܯ is the adjacency matrix held at the cloud, and 
ܮ is another matrix held at the cloud. It contains a list of all Canadian postal codes along with their population sizes. 
To perform the aggregation, the client needs the adjacency information from the cloud for some of its location 
variables. As the client cannot reveal these locations to the cloud, our solution adds noise to each query in the form 
of dummy (obfuscated) locations:  
3.1. One Query Solution 
Assume that a client needs the adjacency information for one location d . As the client cannot reveal d  to the 
cloud, she randomly picks ݇ െ ͳ distinct locations,{݌ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݌௞ିଵሽ all with sizes less than the cut-off ܥ. The client then 
sends a query ݍ requesting adjacency information for all ݇ locations: ሼ݀ǡ ݌ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݌௞ିଵሽ. The cloud, lacking any side 
information, would not be able to determine the correct location from the obfuscated ones. The number of 
obfuscated queries, ݇ െ ͳ, is set by the client. This will define a limit on the probability of identifying a requested 
location by the Cloud. 
This scenario applies well to one query. However, if multiple queries are needed by the client (i.e. if the client 
requires adjacency information on several locations), then we need (i) to make sure that these queries together would 
not breach privacy, and (ii) to prevent the cloud from tracking the client over time. If the cloud is able to track the 
client long term, then it can use the client’s query history to gain information on commonly requested locations.  
3.1. Anonymizer 
As a solution to the second point above, we assume the existence of an anonymizer. The role of the anonymizer is 
to make sessions performed by the same client untraceable. it is a server that acts as a shield between the client and 
the cloud. Before the start of a session, the client requests a session ID from the cloud service through the 
anonymizer. Once granted, the anonymizer performs the queries on the client's behalf using her session ID, receives 
the query outputs from the cloud and directs these back to the proper client (using the ID information). A client is 
given different session IDs for different sessions, thus preventing the cloud from linking sessions to the same client. 
Such anonymizers are used in the internet domain to prevent identity theft and to protect search histories from public 
disclosure21. 
We assume that the cloud and the client have public encryption keys ݇ଵ and ݇ଶ respectively. The locations in the 
queries requested by the client are encrypted using the cloud’s public key, ݇ଵ, and the queries’ outputs (adjacency 
information) are encrypted using the client’s encryption key, ݇ଶ. Thus the anonymizer would have no access to the 
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information exchanged between the two parties, its sole job is to shield the client’s identity from the Cloud. The 
anonymizer is trusted to perform its job correctly. 
As discussed, the anonymizer prevents the Cloud from tracking the client over multiple sessions. So, we still 
need to prevent any privacy disclosures from multiple queries within the same session. This will be evident in the 
overall solution presented next. 
3.1. Overall Solution 
The client first requests a session ID from the cloud through the anonymizer. The geographical area ܩ is indicated 
in the request. The session ID is granted along with the subset ܩכ of matrix ܮ that contains all locations in ܩ along 
with their population size. Now given all the small locations that require adjacency information (small refers to 
locations that are smaller than the cutoff):ሼ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠ሽ߳ܵ, the client uses the matrix ܩ -ሼ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠ሽ to randomly 
choose ݉ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ locations ሼ݀ଵଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀ଵ௠ǡǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௠ ሽ from the set of locations with population sizes below the 
cut-off ܥ. The locations ݀ଵ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௜  will be used as dummies for location ݀௜, they are referred to as the obfuscated 
locations for ݀௜.  
Note that, the construction above, assumes the existence of ݉ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ  locations in ܩ -ሼ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠ሽ with small 
sizes. If this is not the case, then we consider two possible solutions: 
1. Change the value of ݇: given ݒ, the number of small locations in all of ܩ and given ݉, the value ݉Ȁݒ is referred 
to as the sampling fraction or ݏ݂. ݏ݂ sets a limit on the maximum possible privacy that can be achieved. In fact, 
prior to the request of any query by the client, for any randomly chosen small location ݌ א ܩ, the probability that 
݌ belongs to the client’s dataset is already ݉Ȁݒ. Thus ݇ should be chosen ൒ ݉Ȁݒ, in other words, ݇݉ ൑ ݒ. Note 
that, choosing ݇݉ ൑ ݒ guarantees the existence of ݉ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ small locations in ܩ -ሼ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠ሽ. 
2. Increase the size of ܩ: If the client has a preset value of ݇, she can request a bigger area of interest from the start 
that guarantees the existence of ݉ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ small locations. As the cloud has no information on the client’s 
identity (communication is done through an anonymizer), it would not have any prior information on the area 
actually serviced by the client. 
Once all obfuscated sets are chosen, the client defines and stores ݉ queries ݍଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݍ௠, where 
ݍ௜ ൌ ሼ݀௜ǡ ݀ଵ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௜ ሽ. The client is ready now to execute a geographical aggregation algorithm of her choice. Every 
time the adjacency information for a location ݀௜ is needed, the client sends query ݍ௜ to the cloud in encrypted form 
(using the cloud’s public key) through the anonymizer. The cloud decrypts query ݍ௜, retrieves the adjacency 
information for all locations in ሼ݀௜ǡ ݀ଵ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௜ ሽ:ܣ݆݀ሺሼ݀௜ǡ ݀ଵ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௜ ሽሻ, encrypts it using the client’s public key, 
then sends the result back to the client through the anonymizer. The client in turn decrypts the message, extracts the 
required information, ܣ݆݀ሺ݀௜ሻ and discards the rest. 
Note that, if the client has limited storage capacity and cannot store ܣ݆݀ሺ݀௜ሻ for all ݅ א ሼͳǡ ǥ ǡ݉ሽ, then the same 
query ݍ௜ might be requested several times. This also depends on the clustering algorithm used. Some clustering 
algorithms perform their aggregation on the data in one pass22, while others require several passes6,23. In the next 
section, we will analyse the privacy implications from repeated queries. 
4. Privacy Analysis 
In this section, we formulate the re-identification risk for an intruder who tries to identify the correct locations 
requested. The intruder is assumed to be located at the cloud server as all communications between the client and the 
cloud are encrypted. Thus we assume that the intruder has access to each query and to the number of times it is 
requested:ሺݍ௜ǡ ݊௜ሻ. 
The use of an anonymizer guarantees that the cloud has no information on the clients and the 
province(s)/geographical areas they are interested in, thus the intruder cannot classify a location ݈߳ݍ௜ as obfuscated 
based on geography alone (or gain information on the probability of a location being obfuscated based on its 
geography). Moreover, we assume that the intruder cannot determine the particular aggregation algorithm used by 
the cloud from the queries requested. Note that this assumption is plausible, as many aggregation algorithms exist in 
the literature, with each algorithm having several variations. Moreover, each such algorithm depends heavily on the 
population features it is trying to minimize and on the constraints that differ from one execution of the same 
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algorithm to another (compactness, contiguity, cut-off..). Another factor that could affect the output of an algorithm 
is the order of the input data. 
Given a query, ݍ௜ ൌ ሼ݀௜ǡ ݀ଵ௜ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௞ିଵ௜ ሽ, the probability of the intruder identifying the correct location from the 
obfuscated ones is ͳȀ݇. Given that query ݍ௜ is repeated ݊௜ times, and given a variation in population sizes of the 
locations in ݍ௜, would the intruder be able to rule out some of the locations in ݍ௜? 
Assume that ݇ ൌ ʹ, and let ݍ௜ ൌ ሼ݌ǡ ݌ᇱሽ with ȁ݌ȁ ൏ ܥ and ȁ݌ȁ ا ȁ݌ᇱȁ. Then 
1. If query ݍ௜ is requested many times, would the intruder be able to deduce that ݌Ԣ is the likely candidate? Or, 
2. If query ݍ௜ is requested once, would the intruder be able to deduce that ݌ is the likely candidate? 
The questions are legitimate as a postal code close in size to the cut-off most likely requires aggregation with 
only one or very few other postal code(s) to achieve the required population size, and thus such postal code need not 
be requested multiple times. On the other hand, using similar reasoning, if a query is queried once, then it most 
likely corresponds to a postal code with size close to the cut-off. 
However this analysis is faulty given the number of reasons for requesting a query multiple times/ or once. We 
start by treating the first case, i.e. provide some reasons for requesting a query multiple times  
x Some algorithms define a “constraint” parameter that dictates when an aggregation should happen. Such 
algorithms require a strong constraint in the first pass and relax the parameter in every subsequent pass. Thus, in 
our example above, postal code ݌ might not be aggregated from the first few passes, as the available postal codes 
to aggregate it with might not meet the constraint parameter set in the first few passes. 
x Some algorithms allow for navigating postal codes between clusters during all stages of the clustering process. 
Thus a postal code ݌ could be aggregated in one pass and then stripped of its aggregate in the same or subsequent 
passes.  
x Given that most postal codes are very small in nature, several aggregations might be needed for any postal code 
to achieve the required size. Thus݌ could be aggregated with several small postal codes, and could thus be 
requested several times. Moreover, it is worth noting that the cloud does not possess the exact knowledge of the 
cut-off value. 
Similarly, several reasons exist for requesting a query once regardless of its size (although this is rarely the case 
in clustering algorithms with multiple passes) 
x The adjacency of the query could be stored at the client (some adjacency records are stored depending on the 
storage capacity of the client) 
x The postal code in question could be a neighbour of another requested postal code and thus added to it without 
having to query it another time. 
5. Complexity 
The primary metric of interest for our protocol is the total amount of communication between the client and the 
cloud needed for its execution. In a normal setting (where privacy is not a problem), the client sends the requested 
location and the cloud responds with its corresponding adjacency matrix, thus totalling ܱሺ݊ሻ bits of communications 
per query (as the cloud sends ݊ bits). In our setting, every time the client requires the adjacency of a location, it 
sends a query consisting of ݇ locations, and receives the adjacency information for all ݇ locations, totalling ܱሺ݊݇ሻ 
bits of communications per query. 
The storage requirements for the client is ܱሺܩሻ, any extra space would benefit the client in storing the adjacency 
records for the ݉ locations. The time complexity of the Client’s algorithm in the worst case is augmented by ܱሺܩሻ 
(for queries construction) and inflated by ݇ (as the user receives adjacency information for ݇ locations). 
6. Limitations 
We presented an algorithm to privately query a public database for postal codes’ adjacency information. The 
algorithm involves only one server. Its overall computation complexity is linear in ݊ while previous private 
protocols are quadratic in ݊. The protocol assumes that the postal codes to be queried, ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠, are known in 
advance. This implies that the aggregation is done using the set of postal codes in ܦ along with the postal codes 
adjacent to them. In other words, for any postal code ݌ א ܦ, ݌ is aggregated with adjacent postal codes belonging to 
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the set ܦ ׫ ܣ݆݀ሺܦሻ only. The practice of performing geographical aggregation from within the set of postal codes in 
the database ܦ is common and provides better privacy24. However, a more general solution that allows aggregation 
with postal codes from the region ܩ is also desired in many cases. In such general solution, the postal codes to be 
queried can not be known in advance. In fact, if ݌ is aggregated with another postal code ݌Ԣ with ݌ᇱ ב ሼ݀ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݀௠ሽ, 
and if ݌ ׫ ݌Ԣ does not satisfy the population size requirement, then the client needs to retrieve the adjacency 
information for ݌ and ݌Ԣ before deciding on the best way to further her aggregation. As future work, we would like 
to generalize the solution to bypass the limitation above. 
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